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Closing Civic Space and Inclusive Development in Ethiopia 
Tony Roberts 
 
Summary 
This paper presents findings from a case study exploring the prospects for measuring the 
impacts of restricted civic space on development in Ethiopia. It is part of a larger inquiry into 
the phenomenon of restrictions on civil society activity around the world, including but not 
only in developing countries, most notably in the past decade. This case study of Ethiopia 
was a rapid exercise to test an approach to measuring the relationship between closures of 
civic space and development outcomes by tracing the implications of restrictions on NGO 
activities in relation to poverty, hunger and food insecurity, gender equality, with a focus on 
efforts to reach the poorest and most marginalized populations. The research involved 
gathering multiple sources of data, published and grey literature, and interview material, and 
analysing it in relation to a conceptual framework proposing mechanisms through which 
closing civic space impacts on development outcomes. The paper concludes that there are 
good reasons to believe that recent restrictions on civil society, and in particular on NGO 
activities, have played or have the potential to play a clear and adverse role in Ethiopia’s 
development, and specifically to the extent that it is inclusive, equitable, and ‘leaves no one 
behind’. NGO service delivery capacity has been severely reduced in key areas by the 
closing of civic space in Ethiopia. Effects include that legal aid and advocacy for women and 
children is no longer widely available, while 1,741 NGOs were closed down completely; 
many of the remaining NGOs now have significantly reduced service delivery capacity, 
especially in the areas of advocacy for gender, ethnic and minority rights.  
 
Wider implications include clear signs that some of the most marginalised are being left 
behind due to regulations that impose strict limits on NGO travel costs, and which mitigate 
against rural outreach, inclusion and participation. In addition to direct controls on NGOs, an 
effort to restrict the media and to clamp down on new virtual public spaces has also shaped 
the Ethiopian experience with closing space. NGOs have had to curtail their service 
provision in the areas of research, policy analysis, legal advocacy, rights and campaigning 
and have restructured themselves around less-politically contentious areas of service 
provision such as food-aid and poverty-relief. There is currently no civic capacity to hold the 
Government to account at a time of large-scale forced evictions, state killing of protestors, 
mass arrests and penal violence without recourse to legal process, and less capacity to 
support those suffering gender-based violence, detained without trial, or ethnic groups and 
minorities suffering disadvantage and being left behind. There is growing optimism that the 
new political leadership since 2018 may lead to a reconsideration of restrictions on civic 
space; if so, conditions for and measurable contributions of civil society deserve to be 
tracked and monitored closely, to help make the case for civic space in relation to 
development.  
 
The patchy evidence and hard figures available provide robust enough indications that the 
restricted civic space is likely to mean increased inequality and exclusion, and to reverse 
progress made towards poverty reduction and food security, at least for many of the most 
marginalized and impoverished groups. However, existing data systems are too weak to 
support aggregate analysis of the impacts on NGO beneficiary populations, even within the 
selected policy domains or sectors. Other impacts included qualitative changes in 
programme approaches, towards more welfarist service delivery models with less change of 
transformative change and greater chance of dependence. Services may also be lost in 
other policy domains not surveyed here, and while many NGOs adapt to the restrictions and 
the generalized ‘chill’ in the political climate, the human and organizational costs of such 
adaptation tend to go uncounted. Hard-to-reach areas, including regions undergoing conflict, 
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were among those likely to suffer the most, and about which verifiable empirical data was 
most scarce. It would seem that data collection and research is particularly vital in such 
areas, to help establish the losses or changes in civil society provision, as well as any 
replacement Government or Government-sponsored activity. The restraining role of civil 
society and free media on macroeconomic management and corruption, key mechanisms of 
political and economic crisis in developing countries, are further factors likely to add to the 
developmental costs of closing civic space, even if not immediately apparent. The new 
political leadership gives reasons to believe that civic space may reopen in Ethiopia, 
providing a valuable opportunity to track and assess the contributions of civil society to 
inclusive, equitable and sustainable development in a low-income country which has made 
rapid, yet problematically uneven, development progress. 
 
Keywords: Ethiopia; civil society; NGOs; closing civil space; EPRDF, inclusion. 
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1  Introduction: the implications of closing 
civic space for development in Ethiopia 
This paper presents findings from a case study designed to explore the prospects for 
measuring the impacts of restricted civic space on development in Ethiopia. It is part of a 
larger inquiry into the phenomenon of restrictions on civil society activity around the world, 
including but not only in developing countries, most notably in the past decade. Civil society 
refers to all forms of voluntary organization that mediate between the state, market, and 
societal actors and interests. In developing countries, civil society is often taken to refer to 
often aid- or foreign-funded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society 
organizations (CSOs) involved in service delivery or providing a ‘watchdog’ function, holding 
Government and other actors to account. However, civil society generally means a broader 
category of those active within the civic space to include the media and human rights 
defenders, professional associations, academia and thinktanks, as well as social 
movements such as land and indigenous people’s rights groups, women’s and peasant 
movements, workers’ organizations, and environmental activists.  
 
A key overall conclusion of an initial literature review (Hossain et al 2018) was that globally, 
civic space had changed rather than shrunk, and that new actors and spaces for civic 
engagement, including digital, have flourished in the past decade. Yet it is clear that groups 
with liberal democratic and human rights mandates and/or receiving international aid 
financing have been directly targeted. Land and indigenous rights defenders and their 
supporters in the media, academia, and the wider agrarian or social movements of which 
they are part, have faced particularly deadly opposition in a number of settings. Advocates of 
freedom of speech and association, minority rights or empowerment of marginalized groups, 
or environmental protection, also face new more restrictive laws and regulations, arrests and 
detention, as well as more informal efforts such as pressures to align, a ‘chilling’ atmosphere 
that restrains public debate, stigmatization and impunity for attacks on civil society. The 
present case study is part of an inquiry aimed specifically to assess the implications of 
closing civic space for development. It is focussed on the implications for achieving specific 
‘frontline’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) such as poverty and hunger reduction, 
gender equality, health and education, outcomes which may broadly be termed ‘inclusive 
development’, recognizing the SDG principles of equity, inclusion, sustainability, and ‘leaving 
no one behind’.  
 
1.1 About this paper 
This paper is organized as follows. In this first section, a summary of key findings about the 
measurability of development outcomes in Ethiopia is provided. The conceptual basis of the 
study is briefly outlined, followed by a description of the methodology used. Section 2 sets 
out the main understandings of the political economy of inclusive development in relation to 
the specific development challenges facing Ethiopia, situating these within a typology of 
political settlements. Section 3 describes the role of civil society in development in Ethiopia, 
and discusses the changing nature of the ‘fit’ between civic actors and those in the state or 
political society, including episodes of closure and contention over the roles of NGOs and 
CSOs in the development process. Section 4 sets out key episodes of closure and 
contention for civil society, traces the outcomes of regulations on NGO activities in specific 
policy domains, as well as their impacts on service delivery capacity and on beneficiary 
populations. Section 6 concludes with discussion of the measurable impacts and lessons in 
Ethiopia, and the wider implications for the analysis of the impacts of civic space on 
development.  
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1.2 Key findings of the Ethiopia case study 
This case study of Ethiopia was a rapid exercise to test an approach to measuring the 
relationship between closures of civic space and development outcomes by tracing the 
implications of restrictions on NGO activities in relation to poverty, hunger and food 
insecurity and gender equality, with a focus on efforts to reach the poorest and most 
marginalized populations. This involved gathering multiple sources of data, published and 
grey literature, and interview material, and analysing it in relation to a conceptual framework 
discussed in more detail below.  
 
The paper concludes that there are good reasons to believe that recent restrictions on civil 
society, and in particular on NGO activities, have played or have the potential to play a clear 
and adverse role in Ethiopia’s development, and specifically to the extent that it is inclusive, 
equitable, and ‘leaves no one behind’, as the SDG principles put it. NGO service delivery 
capacity has been severely reduced in key areas by the closing of civic space in Ethiopia 
with results including that legal aid and advocacy for women and children is no longer widely 
available, while 1,741 NGOs were closed down completely; many of the remaining NGOs 
now have significantly reduced service delivery capacity, especially in the areas of advocacy 
for gender, ethnic and minority rights. Wider implications include clear signs that some of the 
most marginalised are being left behind due to regulations that impose strict limits on NGO 
travel costs, and which mitigate against rural outreach, inclusion and participation. NGOs 
have had to curtail their service provision in the areas of research, policy analysis, legal 
advocacy, rights and campaigning and have restructured themselves around less-politically 
contentious areas of service provision such as food-aid and poverty-relief. There is currently 
no civic capacity to hold the Government to account at a time of large-scale forced evictions, 
state killing of protestors, mass arrests and penal violence without recourse to legal process. 
Civil society has less capacity to support those suffering gender-based violence, detained 
without trial, or ethnic groups and minorities suffering disadvantage and being left behind. 
 
The case study offers robust insights into the magnitude and nature of selected likely 
development impacts, but concludes this is a limited and fragmented view of the whole. 
Services may be lost in other policy domains not surveyed here, and while many NGOs 
adapt to the restrictions and the generalized ‘chill’ in the political climate, the human and 
organizational costs of such adaptation are generally ignored. The restraining role of civil 
society and free media on macroeconomic management and corruption, key mechanisms of 
political and economic crisis in developing countries, are further factors likely to add to the 
developmental costs of closing civic space, even if not immediately apparent.  
 
However, data systems are too weak even to support aggregate analysis of the impacts on 
NGO beneficiary populations even within the selected policy domains or sectors. Within civil 
society itself, there is limited transparency and coordination, and collective efforts to engage 
with new restrictions have been weak. Other impacts included qualitative changes in 
programme approaches, towards more ‘welfareist’ service delivery models with less chance 
of transformative change, and greater chance of dependence. Hard-to-reach areas, 
including regions undergoing conflict, were among those likely to suffer the most, and about 
which verifiable empirical data was most scarce. The conclusions of the case study are that 
the ‘frontline’ development implications of restrictions on civil society can be measured in 
part, but the current evidence base is thin, patchy, and unintegrated. Key questions remain 
left unanswered, and the case study very likely underestimates the overall extent of the 
adverse development impacts of such shifts, while also excluding consideration of the 
countervailing factors, such as civil society resilience and adaptation, and the growth of 
Government-sponsored citizen groups and entities to replace externally-funded NGOs and 
CSOs. 
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1.3 Inclusive development and the civic space: key concepts and questions 
The design of this case study drew on a conceptual framework which recognized that 
restrictions on civic space were part of wider national political struggles around 
development, and specifically an effort by political elites to concentrate political power over 
the development process. Theories of the political economy of inclusive development 
indicate that how this matters for inclusive development outcomes depends on elite 
commitment and state capacity to deliver broadly inclusive outcomes, in turn shaped by how 
the balance of political power, or political settlement, prioritizes inclusive development 
(Hossain et al. 2018 based on authors cited in the text).  
 
Countries also differ on the extent to which elite commitment and capacity state operate in 
pluralist political settlements, in which civic actors have a voice and a claim, or through 
dominant systems, in which civil society may be co-opted, aligned, or silenced. A key 
question is whether inclusive development outcomes can be delivered in settings where 
political power has closed the space for public debate or participation, or if they depend on 
inclusive civic space, in which civil society actors, marginalized groups and the media are 
empowered to participate in and scrutinize public policy debates and institutions. The 
evidence suggests a range of civil society roles in inclusive development processes, 
including in: 
 
 the historical process of building institutions and establishing values that underpin 
economic growth; 
 the development of partnerships and alliances for aid and development financing; 
 holding governments and market actors to account in its ‘watchdog’ role; 
 the empowerment and inclusion of marginalized groups, including through mobilization 
and service delivery; 
 protective functions in relation to humanitarian assistance and human rights; 
 information and communication, generating evidence and debate about development 
processes.  
 
A safe conclusion seems to be that inclusive processes play some functions necessary to 
sustaining development over the medium- to long-term, by enabling the management of 
difference and the inclusion of the most vulnerable. However, inclusive processes are 
generally insufficient conditions for inclusive outcomes, if they coexist with – or exacerbate - 
a lack of elite commitment or state capacity to deliver. The term ‘inclusive development’ is 
used here in a broad sense, to signal pro-poor and equalizing patterns of economic growth 
alongside robust progress on human development indicators. Among other aims, this paper 
aims to establish the extent to which inclusive outcomes are associated with freer civic 
space in Ethiopia.  
 
Which impacts can be measured depends on different histories of civil society and state-
society relations, and on the ‘fit’ between civil society and the state. This means that it is not 
only free space to operate that matters, but the extent to which civil society can usefully 
engage with or exert influence on the state when it needs to. This ‘fit’ will change over time 
and circumstance, with civic actors at times in opposition to, and at others aligned with, state 
power. Freedom in civic space is important, but capacity to engage is equally so. The case 
study was designed to analyse this fit, through an analysis of key moments of contention 
around civic space between civil society and the state.  
 
1.4 Case study methodology 
The case study tested a methodological approach to direct measurement of the impacts of 
restricted civic space, by tracing restrictions on civic space through to impacts on beneficiary 
populations. The methodology included selecting episodes when civic space had been in 
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contention in policy domains where ‘frontline’ inclusive development outcomes (poverty and 
hunger reduction, gender equality, etc.) were at stake. It documented and analysed how 
NGOs and CSOs responded to new restrictions, the organizations or programmes that faced 
closure or adaptation, and assessed the overall impacts on specific policy domains or SDGs, 
with numerical estimates of impacts on beneficiaries or services. 
 
NGO responses to closures of civic space and how those in turn impact on beneficiary 
populations are shaped overall by the nature of the political settlement on inclusive 
development in a country, and on its specific history of state-civic engagement around 
development processes. Despite recent shifts towards a more inclusive elite pact at the 
heart of political governance, Ethiopia can be classified as a dominant kind of political 
system, with limited and highly regulated space for civic engagement on development 
issues. The ruling elites are committed to fast growth and rapid human development, but 
civic space has been heavily restricted, in particular in the past decade. According to the 
conceptual framework this set of characteristics is likely to impact adversely on: 
 
 the rights and needs of marginalized and excluded groups, possibly through a rise in 
rights violations with impunity, or a loss of service access or quality; 
 accountability for macroeconomic performance, as scrutiny and checks by the media 
and civil society are weakened or disabled, possibly leading to impacts on the 
business environment and political trust; 
 environmental sustainability, across a wide range of potential areas and sectors, but 
particularly in relation to land- and resource-grabbing. 
 
In addition, 
 
 freedom of speech and association are likely to be seen as direct threats to state 
power, particularly with the growth of cyberspace; efforts to constrict entry to this 
space are as likely as efforts to tap its potential for development; 
 contestation over ‘foreign’ norms promoted by human rights defenders and civic actors 
may be politicized and deployed to rationalize restrictions on civic space motivated by 
political power struggles; such contestation is particularly likely to affect women’s rights 
struggles and other purportedly Western or liberal-democratic value systems; and  
 wage, resource, and commodity price struggles are likely in each kind of political 
system, reflecting the volatilities of global economic integration.  
 
The Ethiopia case study consisted of a series of key informant interviews sandwiched 
between two periods of literature review. Twenty eight semi-structured interviews were 
conducted in person in Addis Ababa in collaboration with local researchers, as well as by 
telephone and internet. A purposive sample of key informants was developed which included 
domain expertise from a range of CSOs directly affected by the issues, senior researchers 
from Ethiopian think tanks and universities, a blogger arrested after the closing of civic 
space, staff from international and local NGOs, representatives of bilateral and multilateral 
funders, and university academics with specific expertise in Ethiopian development and civil 
society. In addition to this primary data, desk research, and data provided by expert referral 
the study generated secondary data in the form of statistical and development indicator data 
in order to better situate and illuminate the case further.  
 
Three time periods emerged as significant from the data and are used as a comparative 
analytical and organising device: the period between the current Government coming to 
power in 1991 and the elections in 2005; the post-election period of 2005 and 2010 in which 
the Government developed a range of measures to close civic space; and the period since 
2010 during which time the effects of those measures have unfolded with consequences for 
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NGO service delivery and development impacts. As assessing the full breadth of multi-
dimensional development is beyond the capacity of any single report in order to provide 
focus, the study concentrates on food security and land policy and the implications for 
women and hard-to-reach groups. 
  
From this analysis, the paper then draws methodological conclusions, including about the 
limitations of available measures of potential development impact. The analysis of episodes 
in contestation over civic space highlighted that quantitative measures were mainly either 
projected (what would happen if a programme closed or cut), or difficult to verify (because in 
the past, and because data systems on civil society are very weak). Systems to collate such 
data across policy domains or CSOs would need to overcome several disincentives to share 
such data.  
 
The research faced a number of methodological challenges and limitations. The first was the 
challenge of contemplating a counterfactual: that of lost services if civic space had not been 
closed. Legal changes happened a decade ago, civil society has adapted, personnel have 
moved on, and no detailed records exist of the loss of NGO service delivery capacity or the 
number of citizens affected. Although we know that 1,741 NGOs were shut down completely 
and that many others were forced to withdraw from service provision in crucial areas, in this 
scoping study we were only able to speak to a small fraction of them. Those with whom we 
spoke provided evidence of substantial reductions in service delivery capacity and 
development impact.  
 
The research timeframe and the state of emergency also made it impossible to travel to 
outlying areas during fieldwork for this research. Key informants with extensive experience 
of working in remote areas of Ethiopia suggest that it is there that the comparative 
advantages of CSOs are greatest. NGOs reported that the restrictions placed on NGOs 
mean that it is now much harder for them to travel and to engage with marginalised ethnic 
groups and minorities in rural areas. More extensive research would be necessary to 
measure the nationwide impact of reductions in NGO service delivery among these groups 
at risk of being left behind.  
 
The atmosphere of fear and secrecy, and a leadership transition during the period of the 
research also affected the fieldwork, which affected visa access and travel to and within 
Ethiopia, and the very real ethical and security concerns about asking Ethiopians to 
comment on Government policies at a time when hundreds remain in jail for outspoken 
criticism of the Government. The fieldwork was carried out during the state of emergency but 
after the appointment of a new Prime Minster had reduced tensions.1 Nevertheless, the 
suspension of freedom of speech and jailing of Government critics might reasonably be 
expected to limit the candour of interviewees to questions about Government policies. 
Indeed two of the interviewees declined to comment directly on the Government. However 
others openly criticised Government policies, as well as acknowledging its achievements. 
Anonymous interviews proved easier to organise than a planned focus group, which was 
cancelled when confirmed invitees failed to attend. Given the circumstances it was 
necessary to promise interviewees confidentiality. This report therefore provides no detail 
about the identity of respondents or names of the organisation they work for, in order to 
protect the security of those involved. 
 
 
                                                     
1  At the time of fieldwork Abiy Ahmed had just been appointed Prime Minister of Ethiopia by the ruling party. His 
appointment was widely welcomed as a positive move and this had the effect of reducing tensions in the country. 
During this period it was not yet clear what policy directions would accompany his appointment or whether it amounted 
to anything more than a necessary reshuffle in the ruling elite.   
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2  The political economy of inclusive 
development in Ethiopia 
The country case studies were selected in part to represent different pathways in the political 
economy of development. Ethiopia is representative of a ‘developmental state’ with a non-
competitive ‘dominant’ political settlement in which a single regime has held political power 
for seventeen years. A developmental state is characterised by proactive Government 
intervention in the economy to prioritise development goals – often at the expense of 
democratic liberties and participatory governance (Johnson 1982, Haggard 2018). Some 
Ethiopian scholars have argued that the Government has effectively resisted the neo-liberal 
economic model of free-market and a retreating state that has been prescribed for African 
countries by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Ayenew 2014). Instead 
Ethiopia has actively expanded state functions and sustained long-term investments in pro-
poor expenditure on health, education and infrastructure, in a mixed economy alongside a 
growing private sector and significant aid income. The extent to which this mix is determined 
by an economic vision or is contingent and opportunistic is open to debate, but the result has 
been a substantial and sustained economic growth, poverty reduction, and human 
development gains measured as Millennium and Sustainable Development Goals. It has 
however come at the price of human rights and freedoms.  
 
The developmental state can be interventionist in the social as well as the economic sphere, 
occupying space which in other countries may be the preserve of an independent civil 
society. In Ethiopia, partly in frustration at what it saw as the fragmented and disorganised 
efforts of a myriad of private civic organisations, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF) expanded its own ‘mass organisations’ staffed by party 
members. These centrally-controlled structures were then used to deliver large-scale 
national programmes of relief and development, many of which are widely acknowledged as 
having delivered significant successes and as having contributed to Ethiopia’s achievement 
with respect to the Millennium Development Goals (Ayenew 2014). The existence and 
capacity of these mass organisations may be seen to distinguish Ethiopia from many other 
countries in the region, which may experience a greater reliance on CSOs to deliver their 
poverty reduction programmes.  
 
The Ethiopian developmental state is built in part on the model of Asian developmental 
states such as Japan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. In these Asian cases once 
development was assured the state progressively divested itself of some of its centralised 
economic and civic functions – passing them over to private business and civil society. This 
withdrawal of the state from the market and civic space is not however a certain outcome. 
Ethiopian citizens were not consulted about whether they wished to have a developmental 
state nor have they been consulted about its duration; the prioritisation of development has 
come at the cost of civil rights and democratic freedoms supposedly guaranteed in 
Ethiopia’s constitution (Rahmato 2008). The danger perceived by some analysts is that the 
Ethiopian developmental state “becomes a Trojan Horse for authoritarian rule” (Ayenew 
2014; 9) and delays interminably the day that it relinquishes its power and onset of 
democratic governance and political liberty. There will always be additional developmental 
targets available to an authoritarian state that wishes to further delay the provision of civil 
liberties and human rights that citizens are entitled to.  
 
2.1 Development without freedom 
If development is understood simply as economic growth there is no question that Ethiopia is 
making rapid process from a very weak starting position. Ethiopia’s development progress 
also rates very well when evaluated against a multi-dimensional index such as the Human 
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Development Index that measures health and education as well as income. Even against 
broader measures such as the Millennium Development Goals or Sustainable Development 
Goals, Ethiopia measures up well.  
 
It is only if we equate Development As Freedom as Amartya Sen (1999) and adherents of 
the human development tradition argue that we should, that Ethiopia’s development success 
is questionable. Sen has argued that any comprehensive evaluation of development must 
include an assessment of the freedoms (or capabilities) that citizens have to live the lives 
they choose. Sen (1999: 3) defines development as “a process of expanding the real 
freedoms that people enjoy”, as well as “the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty 
as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as … intolerance or over-activity of 
repressive states”. Ethiopia is improving average education, health and income but it is 
doing it at the expense of freedoms that people have reason to value. 
 
According to the Ethiopian Government’s own figures GDP growth has averaged around 
10 per cent for a decade and a half. The analysis of independent economists within Ethiopia 
and economists from the World Bank suggests that these figures are likely to overstate 
growth (Alemayehu and Addis 2014). However, even lower estimates of 5-8 per cent are 
impressive, in regional and global comparison. Ethiopia has had the fastest growing 
economy in the world (World Bank 2017) and its progress is also outstanding when 
measured using multi-dimensional poverty indexes (Alkire and Santos 2010) or assessed in 
terms of the remarkable progress they made in achieving most of the Millennium 
Development Goals (Assefa 2017), and now in relation to progress against the Sustainable 
Development Goals.  
 
Figure 2.1 depicts Ethiopia’s progress using the Human Development Index, showing that 
the country has indeed made relatively rapid progress from a lower base compared to 
regional and income-level average performance.  
 
Figure 2.1 HDI trends, Ethiopia and comparators 1990–2015 
 
Source:  Human Development Index; http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends (accessed 30 August 2018) 
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These substantial achievements notwithstanding, Ethiopia remains a low-income country at 
a low overall level of human development, in which millions continue to live in poverty, 
including around 8 million per year who rely on food aid from international donors (WFP 
2018). There is general recognition that, despite the overall reduction in absolute poverty, 
disadvantaged groups are being left behind. This concern was reflected in prioritisation by 
DFID and other donors of these hard-to-reach groups in their £28 million Civil Society 
Support Programme (CSSP) that ran from 2011-2016 (DFID 2016).2 
 
2.2 Three periods of EPRDF in power  
Emperor Haile Selassie ruled Ethiopia until he was deposed, in 1974, by the Derg military 
dictatorship. The Derg regime lasted until 1991 when after two decades of civil war the 
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) came to power. Tigrayans only account for 3 per 
cent of the Ethiopian population whereas the people of Oromia and Amhara combined 
account for 61 per cent of the population. In order to broaden its popular base the TPLF 
formed the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) which incorporated 
three other ethnic-based parties from Oromia, Amhara and Southern regions (excluding five 
other regions). The EPRDF established an ethnically-based federal structure through which 
to govern the country, with each ethnic group forming its own ruling party (Rahmato 2008).  
 
Prior to taking power in 1991 the TPLF had been vocal critics of the Derg’s autocratic rule, 
so when they formed a Government there was great expectation that there would be an 
opening of political and civic space. Relative to the Derg’s military dictatorship the new 
Government did represent an opening of political space and some powers were devolved 
through the new federal structure to provincial and district administrations. However critics 
claim that those devolved administrations remain under EPRDF control and that power 
resides with a small elite of mainly Tigrayan politicians, military and police officials, and 
business leaders. Over time tensions emerged within the EPRDF ruling elite and wider 
society about the disproportionate power wielded by the minority Tigrayan community 
especially in relation to the more populous Oromia and Amhara regions. Other regions and 
ethnic groups including the Somalis, Afars and Gambelis were never incorporated within the 
EPRDF and have never benefited equally from Ethiopia’s economic growth or poverty 
reduction programmes.   
 
2.2.1 1991–2005: A political opening 
Nevertheless, the EPRDF represented an opening of economic, political and civic space 
relative to the Derg regime. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was incorporated 
into the Charter of the Transitional Government in 1991 signalling support for civic freedoms 
and rights. New space opened for the formation of opposition political parties, a free press, 
and the flourishing of CSOs. NGOs that been limited to relief and rehabilitation activities 
prior to 1991 now begun to extend their scope to include human development and human 
rights. From the year 2000 onwards regular elections took place in Ethiopia with 
independent opposition parties. Particularly in the run-up to the 2005 elections an 
“unprecedented liberalisation” took place in Ethiopia (Aalen and Tronvell 2009; 194). 
Alternative newspapers were launched and an Ethiopian blogosphere developed 
(Gagliardone et al 2018). In this opening of civic space a number of new political parties and 
coalitions were formed in the context of a flourishing of public debate and civic education 
about the nation’s priorities for social and economic development (Zewde and Pauseway 
2002). A dynamic and vibrant civil society threw itself into nationwide programmes of voter 
registration and civic education. The mass media hosted hugely popular live discussions that 
raised public consciousness of political and civic issues to unprecedented levels.  
                                                     
2  The CSSP originally ran from 2011-2016 and was extended 2016-2017. At the time of this research a new programme 
was being established but had not been launched. 
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2.2.2 2005–10: Post-election closures of civic and political space 
The political temperature changed drastically following the election of 2005. The EPRDF lost 
its electoral support and was only able to stay in power by using military force and arresting 
opposition leaders (Nega and Milofsky 2011). When the opposition Coalition for Unity and 
Democracy (CUD) won 84 per cent of the vote in Addis Ababa, the regime blamed the 
‘foreign influenced’ civil society. The EPRDF took a series of reactive measures to close 
civic space, restrict media freedom and discipline outspoken activists. In the years following 
the election the Government issued a slew of laws that closed space for civil society and 
restricted freedoms of speech and association. An anti-terrorist law gave the state arbitrary 
power to arrest and jail suspects without charge. The arrest of hundreds of journalists, 
opposition politicians, bloggers and activists had a chilling effect3: taming the media and 
leading to self-censorship by journalists and public intellectuals (Dupuy et al 2014). 
Ethiopia’s 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation made it illegal for organisations who 
receive more than 10 per cent of their funding from foreign sources to work on gender or 
human rights, ethnic inclusion, or voter education (Hailegebriel 2010). 
  
2.2.3 2010–18: A hostile environment 
Following its electoral shock the EPRDF became more authoritarian and intolerant of 
political opposition or civic activism. The progressive stifling of dissent and the closing of 
space for civil society has resulted in periodic outbursts of uncivil society and periods of 
unruly politics. The Government’s land grab in Oromia and the associated forced removal of 
populations became the catalyst for widespread and sustained demonstrations from 2015 
(Freedom House 2017). The EPRDF responded by imposing a ten-month4 State of 
Emergency in 2016/7. New youth movements in Oromia and Amhara have emerged, 
combining street demonstrations with social media campaigns within Ethiopia and linking 
electronically to the Ethiopian diaspora in the USA and Europe to amplify their actions. Key 
elements in these new youth movements have refused to be divided along ethnic lines and 
created unity between Oromo youth and Amhara youth that presents a serious challenge to 
the Tigrayan leadership of the EPRDF. As demonstrations escalated again in early 2018, a 
second State of Emergency was declared and the EPRDF was forced once more to rely on 
authoritarian measures to retain power. That State of Emergency remained in place at the 
time of writing this report5. 
 
It is claimed by some that the political dominance of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) within the ruling EPRDF is reflected in uneven distribution of political power which 
translates into unequal development (Gagliardone et al 2018). Minority control by Tigrayans 
is resented by the other EPRDF parties from Oromia, Amhara and Southern, who far 
outnumber Tigrayans in population terms. Five other regions are not represented within the 
EPRDF at all, including the country’s least developed regions, and the impressive aggregate 
national economic growth figures mask significant regional inequalities.  
 
Although there has been no war since June 2000 it is not possible to characterise Ethiopia 
as peaceful due to on-going regional conflicts and state violence against opposition groups. 
According to the Armed Conflict and Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) Oromia and 
Somalia regions are the most dangerous. According to ACLED: 
 
The Government is the main perpetrator of political violence, which often aims to 
suppress various forms of political opposition. Prominent anti-government 
movements and… localised political militias, violent clashes between these 
                                                     
3  www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/27/ethiopia-zone-9-bloggers-jailed-freedom-expression. 
4  Initially a six-month state of emergency later extended to ten-months. 
5  Fieldwork was conducted immediately after Dr. Abiy Ahmed was installed as the new Prime Minster representing a 
period of change in the composition of the ruling elite. The new Prime Minster was seen by those that we spoke to as a 
positive move as he could bridge Oromia - Tigray divisions and as was more progressive on human rights. 
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movements and the Government resulted in almost 7,000 reported fatalities over 
the past ten years.6  
 
There have been brief openings as well as closings of civic space. In addition to the opening 
prior to 2005 some of those we interviewed noted an opening in 2013-14. A university-based 
interviewee who has closely analysed civic space in Ethiopia commented that: 
 
In 2013 there was a brief period of relaxation, a little bit of dialogue, at least 
cosmetically, but once the protests happened in 2015 the real EPRDF 
reappeared. They imposed the State of Emergency. Rounded up the opposition 
and jailed them. 
 
 
3  Civil society in Ethiopia  
3.1 The growth of civil society, 1991–2005 
Prior to the Derg coming to power in 1974 Ethiopia had a tiny number of formal CSOs. 
During the famines of the 1970s and 1980s the Derg accepted foreign aid and a modest 
expansion of CSOs. The small number of mainly international NGOs that did exist under the 
Derg were focused primarily on food-aid and basic service delivery. When the EPRDF took 
power in 1991 a gradual opening of civic space took place. Despite the EPRDF’s initial 
suspicion that CSOs were part of the opposition and represented a threat to their authority 
(Rahmato 2008) in the aftermath of the Eritrean war the regime needed the assistance of 
civil society to manage the relief effort and the civic space opened further (Dupuy et al 
2014). The expansion of civil society within Ethiopia coincided with the prioritisation of civil 
society as a policy objective by international development donors who invested heavily in 
CSOs as means to promote global liberal values of rights, equality and social justice 
(Reimann 2006).  
 
From a total of just 70 CSOs in 1991 the number of nationally registered organisations grew 
to 600 by 2001 and to over 2,300 by 2007 (Rahmato 2008; Dupuy et al 2014). Adding 
nationally-registered CSOs to those organisations registered in the regions, the total reaches 
3,822 CSOs (CCRDA 2011),7 not including traditional structures and informal associations.8 
During this period it was not only the scale of Ethiopian CSOs that expanded, it was also 
their scope. CSOs grew in numbers, extending their areas of operations beyond famine 
relief and basic service provision to engage citizens in advocacy, rights-based work and 
awareness-raising about the root causes of poverty and injustice. The numerical expansion 
of CSOs reflected in part the rapid expansion of foreign funding available; the expansion of 
objectives reflected in part the changing policy concerns and priorities of those funders 
(Reimann 2006).  
 
Prior to 2005 a space had also begun to open up for civil society to participate in national 
development policy formation including the consultation for the 2000-2005 Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (known as SDPRP). A senior policy analyst told us,  
 
CSOs became increasingly engaged in development activities and awareness 
creation to make policy formulation participatory. Accordingly, CSOs facilitated 
                                                     
6  www.acleddata.com/dashboard/#231 
7  This total is still low compared to neighbouring countries like Kenya that have half the population of Ethiopia but where 
there are 70,000 registered CSOs. 
8  A comprehensive analysis of Ethiopia’s civil society would also require consideration of the very many local faith-based, 
savings societies and other non-registered CSOs that are part of the fabric of community life and of community 
development but which are not captured in national statistics. 
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several grass root level public discussions in the formulation and implementation 
of such development policies as PRSP, SDPRP AND PASDEP. 
 
This movement towards more inclusive institutions is noted by Rahmato (2008) who argues 
that whilst this opening of space for civic participation in the 2000-2005 PRSP (known as 
SDPRP) was a welcome step in the right direction it was a largely tokenistic process 
undertaken in order to satisfy the donor community. Ayenew (2014) further notes that five 
years later the process of developing the 2005-2010 PRSP (known as PASDEP) eschewed 
participation and was Government-dominated by comparison. This period is the focus of the 
next section. 
 
3.2 2005–10: The closing of civic space 
The opening of civic space under the EPRDF prior to 2005 was dramatically reversed in the 
wake of the 2005 elections in which the EPRDF experienced significant electoral losses 
(Aalen and Tronvoll 2009). The EPRDF accused ‘foreign-funded’ civil society of serving 
foreign interests (Hailegebriel 2010a). Interviewees noted that among the mechanisms 
employed to delegitimise civil society were EPRDF use of the state media control to use 
popular soap operas to portray CSOs as over-paid, corrupt and untrustworthy. The EPRDF 
criticised what it saw as the uncoordinated inefficiency of CSOs’ scattergun programme, 
entreating Ethiopians to join their own ‘mass organisations’ to deliver centrally-coordinated 
nationwide programmes of development and relief. National women’s and youth structures 
were mobilised as were development associations in each province in an example of the 
developmental state attempting to directly shape civic space. This capacity to substitute 
Government-led citizen organisations to carry out work, which in other countries requires 
foreign-funded CSOs, may be a significant distinguishing feature of Ethiopia when compared 
to other closing civic space case studies.   
 
The Civil Society Proclamation required all CSOs to re-register with a new Federal Charities 
and Societies Agency (CSA). CSO registration categories were now based on the 
organisation’s source of funding, as illustrated in Table 3.1. The Proclamation made 
advocacy and rights-based work illegal for any organisation receiving more than 10 per cent 
of their income from foreign sources (Dupuy et al 2014); this is referred to as the ‘90/10 rule’ 
on funding. Any organisation receiving more than 10 of its income had to register as a 
‘Resident CSO’ and was prohibited from working on advocacy or rights-based work or 
campaigning. Most advocacy and rights-based CSOs had been predominantly foreign-
funded (CCRDA 2011). They now faced the choice of either refusing foreign income and 
registering as an ‘Ethiopian CSO’ or shut down the advocacy and rights-based elements of 
their work.  
 
Table 3.1 CSO categories and restrictions 
CSO Category 90/10 Funding Rule 70/30 Spending Rule Activity Restriction  
Ethiopian CSOs Maximum of 10%  
Foreign Funding 
Maximum 30%  
Spending on Admin 
None 
Resident CSOs 10% to 100%  
Foreign Funding 
Maximum 30%  
Spending on Admin 
No advocacy, rights or 
campaigning 
International CSOs 100%  
Foreign Funding 
Maximum 30%  
Spending on Admin 
No advocacy, rights or 
campaigning 
Source:  Author based on document review and interviews 
 
The Proclamation also ruled that no CSO could spend more than 30 per cent of its total 
income on administration; this is referred to as the ‘70/30 rule’ on spending. The major 
challenge of the 70/30 rule was that the CSA considered capacity-building, training, 
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research, policy development, advocacy and campaigning, monitoring and evaluation as 
administrative costs - and all travel expenses were treated as administration costs too. 
Under standard CSO accounting rules these would be considered core CSO activities not 
administration. This severely limits the ability of CSOs to travel and to provide services that 
facilitate the inclusion of hard-to-reach communities or enable their participation in 
development processes. The 70/30 Rule then made it difficult even for locally-funded 
‘Ethiopian CSOs’ (who were not subject to the 90/10 Rule at all) to conduct advocacy work, 
to engage in systematic research to inform policy alternatives, or to conduct outreach 
programmes that leave no one behind.  
 
As a result of the Proclamation many advocacy and rights organisations shut down 
altogether or rebranded themselves as food relief or service delivery organisations (Dupuy et 
al 2014). As we learned from interviewees in this research, the organisational capacity of 
many remaining organisations was drastically reduced and many previously vibrant 
organisations have now fallen into decline.  
 
The uncertainty and confusion caused by the fallout of the 2005 election created a hiatus in 
funding for Ethiopian CSOs as donors and CSOs tried to process the implications of the 
Government’s new hostile environment towards civil society and especially toward foreign-
funded CSOs (Nega and Milofsky 2011). As a result of the change of Government attitude 
some funders pulled out of Ethiopia altogether; others suspended making new funding 
decisions and reviewed their programmes. It is worth noting that this hiatus coincided with 
the economic crash of 2008 in donor countries and the recession that followed it, so some 
funding suspension and reductions may be properly attributed to these external factors. In 
any event the fallout was that the number of CSOs working on advocacy and governance 
issues was greatly reduced and the capacity of those who continued to work on rights-based 
issues was dramatically reduced. The words ‘advocacy’ and ‘rights’ became taboo. Many 
CSOs that had been working on civic education, gender rights and policy advocacy either 
reinvented themselves as focused on poverty reduction or withered away.  
 
Figure 3.1 ODA, food aid and humanitarian aid commitments to Ethiopia (in US$ 
millions) 
 
 
Source:  Dataset: Total receipts by country and region (ODA+OOF+private); Data extracted on 27 Apr 2018 17:41 UTC (GMT) 
from OECD.Stat. 
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3.3 2010–18: Adapting to a hostile environment 
After the initial contraction and restructuring of CSOs to comply with the legislation 
organisations have accommodated themselves to this new order. However, the environment 
for civil society action continued to be hostile, and marked by the pro-active de-registering of 
hundreds of CSOs for failure to comply with the new regulations. By 2011 the number of 
local NGOs registered at the national level fell by 25 per cent from 2,275 to 1,701, whilst the 
total number of all civic organisations including religious and cultural organisations at the 
regional and national level fell from 3,800 to 2,059 (Dupuy et al 2014). Some 1,741 
previously registered organisations disappeared during the first two years after the 
Proclamation.9 For many of those that survived the cull, falling income levels, and the new 
activity restrictions progressively reduced their operational effectiveness. Perhaps ironically, 
given the EPRDF’s attribution of the problem to ‘foreign interests’, the number of registered 
international NGOs was unaffected.  
 
Two positive aspects of the Proclamation were widely acknowledged by interviewees: for the 
first time a level of transparency and regulatory control over CSOs had been established, 
and new provision was made for the existence of CSO networks. The proclamation officially 
recognised CSO networks and consortia, providing them with a legal basis for operating, 
whilst making them subject to the same regulations.  
 
CSOs accommodated themselves to the new order in various ways. Some interviewees told 
us that after the initial hiatus they managed to keep operating without fundamental changes 
by altering the language that they used to describe their work. For example instead of 
describing their work as women’s rights and awareness raising they spoke of essentially the 
same work in terms of women’s empowerment and training. Larger organisations, where 
advocacy was only one of a broad portfolio of activities, tended to fare better, in particular 
than smaller CSOs focused exclusively on gender rights and advocacy. After an initial pause 
to make sense of the new regulatory landscape and its implications for civil society, donors 
made possible workshops and new funding channels for CSOs seeking to identify pathways 
to development impact within the new operating landscape. The multi-donor Civil Society 
Support programme has been the largest sustained effort to support this work (DFID 2016). 
  
 
4  Episodes of closure and contention over 
civic space 
This section presents the empirical findings from interviews and data collected this case 
study and analyses the evidence in order to trace the impact pathways from the 
Government’s closing of civic space (including laws, finances and regulations) through 
particular mechanisms (such as reduced income, staffing and self-censorship) resulting in 
development impacts such as reduced inclusion, growing inequalities, and increased 
injustice. An exhaustive assessment of the impacts on all aspects of development is beyond 
the scope of any single study and so here, in order to provide focus, the study limits the 
discussion to the areas of hunger and food security, land policy, and the implications for 
gender equality and hard-to-reach groups as issues most likely to shed light on how civic 
space may impact on development outcomes. It will in addition consider some wider civic 
space issues, including with respect to the role of the media and new forms of virtual or 
digital public space. Each issue will be considered with reference to the three time periods 
                                                     
9  One source (Yntiso et al 2014) put the total of registered CSOs in 2014 at 3,077 but states that the majority of those 
registered are not operational. We were told anecdotally that the official figure has remained around 3,000 for some 
years but that most were not operating. 
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established in the preceding section in order to understand the changing contribution of civil 
society in meeting Ethiopia’s poverty-reduction and inclusive-development goals.  
 
4.1 Food security and land policy 
The EPRDF commitment to peasant farmers was reflected in its early agrarian policy. Eighty 
five per cent of Ethiopia’s population depended primarily on small-scale agriculture (MoFED 
2003) so investing in small farm development had widespread popular appeal and broader 
developmental significance. EPRDF land policy provided security to smallholders and 
helped them increase their productivity as a means to accumulate a national surplus to 
invest in industrialisation. This encouragement of labour-intensive smallholder agriculture 
was consistent with the developmental state policies that had been successfully applied in 
South Korea and Taiwan. By investing in small farms the Government also avoided the 
growth of a land-owning class and ensured that gains in farm productivity were widely 
shared: socialised rather than privatised. During this period inequality was significantly 
reduced and Ethiopia achieved some of the lowest levels of inequality on the continent 
(World Bank 2014). As we see later in this section a change in EPRDF policy in favour of 
land-clearance for industrial-scale farming by foreign investors carries significantly higher 
risks for food security, economic growth, and equitable and inclusive development (Lavers 
2012).  
 
The EPRDF’s record on delivering food security and famine prevention is generally strong. 
There is perhaps no other Government that has been as single-minded, over such a long 
period, and that has achieved as much success as the EPRDF in pursuing these poverty-
reduction goals (de Waal 2018). None of the interviewees that we spoke with denied the 
progress that the Government had made in these key areas. One rural development expert 
noted: 
 
There is no doubt that the Government is sincere in its desire to reduce poverty 
or that it has been successful in producing economic growth and improved food 
security.  
 
At the heart of the EPRDF programme has been the linked commitments to famine 
prevention and smallholder productivity. When the EPRDF came to power Ethiopia was 
characterised by famine and war, and had one of the highest poverty rates in the world. 
Since the end of their war with Eritrea, the record of the EPRDF in reducing poverty and 
ending famine is remarkable. By making sustained investments in the productivity of small 
land-holdings the Government managed to more than double cereal production in the 
decade between 2004 and 2014, significantly increasing rural household incomes and food 
security. In 2001, 56 per cent of the population was living on USD1.25 PPP a day or less 
and 44 per cent of the population was below the national poverty line. By 2011, those living 
on less than USD1.25 PPP a day had fallen to 31 per cent, and the number living in poverty 
had fallen below 30 per cent for the first time (World Bank 2014). Ethiopia’s progress in 
reducing poverty and food insecurity, when compared to countries at similar levels of 
development, is reflected across a wide range of indicators (see Figures below). 
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Figure 4.1 Prevalence of poverty, Ethiopia and comparators 
 
Source: World Development Indicators / SDGs database 
 
Figure 4.2 Prevalence of undernourishment, Ethiopia and comparators 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators /Millennium Development Goals database 
 
Reducing poverty and hunger was central to the concerns of the EPRDF leaders even 
before they came to power. Land reform and avoiding famine has always been at the heart 
of their political strategy, leading some to characterise their overarching policy as a kind of 
‘anti-famine political contract’ (de Waal 2018; 150). Famine had played a key role in the 
downfall of both regimes that preceded the EPRDF. The 1973 famine catalysed popular 
opposition to the lavish lifestyle excesses of His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie. The 
revolutionary committee or Derg regime that replaced HIM introduced new measures to 
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enhance food security, but ten years after coming to power, drought, famine, and their own 
use of mass starvation as a weapon of war fatally undermined their rule (de Waal 2018).  
 
Since the end of the Eritrean war the EPRDF has delivered not only strong economic growth 
but increased agricultural output, livestock production and, in non-drought years, decreased 
reliance on wheat imports (EEA 2017). Ethiopia remains a low income country where one 
third of the population still live on less than $1.90 per day and remain acutely vulnerable to 
food insecurity. Approximately 8 million Ethiopians required food aid in both 2017 and in 
2018 in addition to the 8 million already supported through the Productive Safety Net 
Programme (PSNP). The next section examines how changes in the space for civil society 
have impacted on poverty reduction and food security over the lifetime of the EPRDF 
Government. 
 
Ethiopia is now famine-free partly because of the sustained commitment of the EPRDF to 
increasing domestic agricultural output and improvements made to disaster preparedness 
and resilience (de Waal 2018). Ethiopia has also benefited from improved relations and 
drought response support from international donors. When it came to power the EPRDF 
oversaw a significant expansion in the number of local and international CSOs. These CSOs 
made significant contributions in supporting agricultural extension to improve smallholder 
productivity, drought preparedness, and food aid delivery.  
 
However, in 2000-1, when drought struck in South-East Ethiopia whilst the EPRDF was 
fighting a territorial war with Eritrea on Ethiopia’s north-western border, as many as 25,000 
children died. International donors were reluctant to assist the regime at a time when it was 
spending heavily on pursuing a war with Eritrea. Two years later in 2002-3, after the war had 
ended, a more serious nationwide drought struck Ethiopia, again raising the spectre of 
famine. The EPRDF had significantly upgraded its drought preparedness and was able to 
deploy an effective national disaster response programme in collaboration with hundreds of 
CSOs. This domestic mobilisation was soon reinforced by a major mobilisation of 
international food aid and Ethiopia successfully averted famine. Since ending the Eritrean 
war, donor support for Ethiopia had increased significantly in part due to Ethiopia’s new role 
as the USA’s key strategic ally in the region in the so-called ‘war on terror’ (de Waal 2018).  
 
Experts that we interviewed described an explosion in the capacity of foreign-funded CSOs 
in the years preceding the 1999-2000 and 2002-3 droughts. The majority of these CSOs 
included poverty reduction, food security or emergency relief among their core activities 
(Rahmato 2008). Recalling that pre-2005 period one civil society leader argued that CSOs 
had contributed significantly to national poverty reduction and drought relief efforts:  
 
Non-state actors in Ethiopia played a vital role in providing social protection 
services to address poverty, inequality and vulnerabilities, affecting livelihoods … 
[and] helping Ethiopia achieve its development goals.    
 
Despite success in averting famine, the 2002-3 drought revealed the continued fragility of 
Ethiopia’s food security and its continued dependency on food-aid. This led, in 2005, to the 
Government and donors putting in place a more robust food aid and social protection 
programme called the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). The PSNP was initially 
rolled out to five million Ethiopians and later expanded to eight million, providing food aid to 
people experiencing chronic food insecurity. To fund the PSNP the Ethiopian Government 
relies on money from international donors. To deliver the PSNP it draws on its own mass 
organisations, international NGOs and on the service delivery capacity of local civil society.  
 
The opening of space for CSOs as service delivery agents in the PSNP, service delivery has 
been in marked contrast to the closing of space for the same organisations in advocacy and 
rights-based work. Aalen and Tronvoll (2009) are among those to show how dramatically the 
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EPRDF changed its orientation to CSOs in the wake of the 2005 elections. While the 2009 
Proclamation on Civil Society legally prevents foreign-funded ‘resident’ CSOs from engaging 
in advocacy or rights-based work, the EPRDF permits the same CSOs to play a supporting 
role as service providers delivering food-aid as part of the PSNP or other poverty reduction 
programmes.  
 
These changes to the legal and funding environment forced CSO actors whose work had 
previously included women and children’s rights to redirect their organisational energies to 
service delivery. As the CCRDA Impact Assessment (2011) and other studies have 
illustrated, the 2009 legal changes resulted in an overall reduction in CSO capacity for 
advocacy and rights and a relative increase in CSO capacity for food security and other 
basic service delivery. 
 
Most interviewees readily acknowledged the Ethiopian Government’s progress in addressing 
food-security and famine prevention. At the same time they identified ways in which the 
Government’s approach acted as an obstacle to inclusive and sustainable development. A 
senior researcher that we interviewed in Addis suggested that the Government’s nationwide, 
centralised, one-size-fits-all programme was both its strength and its weakness: 
 
The Government-led programmes were lifesaving. They had nationwide reach, 
but large Government-driven programmes are not flexible enough to tailor 
services to the most excluded. It’s smaller, agile, CSOs with local knowledge and 
specialist skills that’s better there.  
 
The PSNP is widely acknowledged to have increased food security and to have been 
effective in protecting the poor from drought (Cochrane and Temiru 2016). Nonetheless 
critics have argued that the PSNP has been used to benefit party loyalists and to entrench 
EPRDF political control at the local level (de Waal 2018). The Director of a large CSO 
commented that: 
 
Food-aid distributed by party loyalists can be a form of patronage, not always, 
but I’ve seen it. Some ethnic groups and some minorities are discriminated 
[against]. The 70/30 rule means that [since 2009] regular travel to marginal areas 
is impossible, because travel expenses are treated as ‘administration’. It works 
against participation and inclusion of rural minorities.  
 
4.2 Land policy and land rights 
According to Lefort (2015) Ethiopia’s per capita annual cereal output of 270 kg is well over 
the 180 kg/person/year required for domestic food security. However, Ethiopia remains 
dependent on international economic and food aid. The Government’s strategy for 
progressing to middle income status by 2025 (EEA 2017) remains one of rapid industrial 
expansion led by agriculture. This strategy requires Ethiopia to generate and use an 
agricultural surplus in order to accumulate the capital necessary to invest in industrialisation 
projects. Thus the EPRDF argues in its Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) that further 
gains in agricultural productivity are key to food-security and economic growth (Lavers 
2012). This felt need for further increases in agricultural productivity has led the EPRDF to 
pivot away from investing in smallholdings and toward support for large commercial farms. 
To make this possible the EPRDF has earmarked 3.6 million hectares of land for commercial 
farming (and area equivalent to the Netherlands).  
 
The Ethiopian Government has introduced the compulsory relocation of the indigenous 
populations from this land, including farmers on smallholdings, in order to provide the land to 
foreign companies (Lavers 2012). None of the land set aside for commercial plantations is in 
Tigray; half is in Oromia, Amhara and Southern region (Lavers, 2012) creating significant 
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potential for inequalities between and within ethnic communities. The most contentious of 
these ‘land grabs’ to date have been in Oromia on its border with Addis Ababa. Protests by 
farmers evicted from their ancestral lands were met by police firing live rounds. Thousands 
of protesters, activists and journalists were arrested in widespread police crackdowns, and 
many were held for months without charge or trial (Amnesty 2018). According to Amnesty 
International there are persistent claims that arrested citizens are regularly beaten or 
tortured.    
 
The logic offered in support of these policies is to increase food security and drive export-led 
economic growth. However, the policy is vulnerable on both counts. Predicating growth on 
agricultural exports is a high-risk strategy due to volatile commodity prices. Although foreign 
investors may plan to sell a percentage of their food crops into Ethiopia (especially when 
world prices are low) when world prices rise they would be entirely free and powerfully 
incentivised to redirect food crops to more lucrative overseas markets, with a potentially 
negative effect on Ethiopia’s food security. Some of the investing companies exist 
specifically to secure the food-security of their own countries; the largest land-holdings so far 
have been sold to nationals of Saudi Arabia, Germany, Djibouti and Israel (Lavers 2012). 
 
Whilst interviewees praised the Government’s record on food security and poverty-reduction, 
signs of growing inequality was a common refrain. As one interviewee with long experience 
of programmes in twenty villages across different regions commented:   
 
Government-led programmes have led to significant improvements across the 
country in terms of improved agricultural methods, increased average incomes, 
higher participation levels for rural women and reductions in gender-based 
violence. At the same time we are also seeing a widening inequality gap with 
some signs of class formation between the wealthiest and poorest.  
 
Despite active opposition to its land clearance programme the EPRDF has pressed ahead. 
In 2015, during the most repressive period of its rule to date, the EPRDF succeeded in 
organising a highly effective emergency relief programme in the face widespread drought. 
The World Food Programme assessment was that ten million people were in need of food 
aid in addition to the eight million already enrolled in the PRSN. The EPRDF responded by 
employing 6 million people in an ambitious food-for-work programme and importing a fleet of 
trucks to distribute food and water (de Waal 2018). While the Government led at the national 
level and through its mass-organisations, a wide range of Ethiopian and International CSOs 
played a major role in service delivery. The EPRDF was able to respond with positive effect 
because it had significantly increased domestic food supply and reserves, made dramatic 
improvements in its road and market infrastructure, improved mobile communications, and 
significantly upgraded the Government’s disaster risk reduction and resilience systems, with 
the result that no excess mortality was reported and the price of basic grains was kept under 
control during the harshest food crisis the Government had experienced (de Waal 2018).  
 
De Waal (2018) points out that the map of drought relief and the map of anti-government 
protests in 2015-16 do not overlap: those in receipt of food relief were evidently not 
motivated to bite the hand that was feeding them. The EPRDF have significantly advanced 
the country’s ability to avert famine, even under the most difficult conditions. There have 
however been accusations that the EPRDF’s famine relief has been better organised and 
more generous in Tigray than elsewhere and that some other areas have fared less well (de 
Waal 2018).  
 
From a Western liberal perspective there is a jarring contradiction between the EPRDF’s 
sincere determination to reduce poverty and hunger, and its denial of civic freedoms and 
access to justice to its citizens. One interviewee, an Ethiopian development consultant, 
articulated the EPRDF developmental state priorities without fully supporting them:  
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The strategic imperative for the EPRDF is to restructure the economy away from 
subsistence agriculture and toward rapid industrialisation. Allowing foreign-
interests to advocate for other agendas is a diversion. Freedom and justice are 
luxuries that we cannot currently afford.   
 
Some of those we interviewed argued that this strategy could not be sustained as people 
valued civic and political freedoms as well as freedom from hunger. People were impressed 
by the Government’s poverty reduction accomplishments but felt that it had become deaf to 
citizen’s other concerns causing public support to ebb away. One political economist 
suggested during interview that,    
 
The Government’s strategy is not sustainable in the long run. You cannot take 
people’s land and convince them it is good for them. People’s concerns are not 
being heard, not taken into consideration. No one supports them anymore. 
 
In this section we have seen that despite the EPRDF’s impressive record on food security 
and their successful measures to avert famine, there are questions about whether Ethiopia’s 
pattern of development can be considered either inclusive or equitable. The 2009 
Proclamation realised the Government’s objective of closing civic space for advocacy and 
rights-based work, which the EPRDF saw as a threat to its political and developmental 
project. The proclamation also had the effect of redirecting CSO capacity towards food-
security and other less politically-contentious service-delivery functions. Recent forced land-
clearances have been met by episodes of violent contention and have resulted in hundreds 
of deaths and the arrest of tens of thousands of citizens without due process. Denied civic 
space in which to offer alternative policy proposals, street protest has been the public 
response. Denied recourse to legal advocacy or to legal defence by CSOs those 
dispossessed of their land or finding themselves in prison without charge or trial are 
excluded from anything that can be considered inclusive or equitable development. 
Interviewees suggest that as long as citizens are denied space for civil expression of their 
constitutional and human rights, further uncivil and unruly contestation is inevitable.  
 
4.3 Marginalized and ‘hard-to-reach’ groups 
Previous sections have shown that the EPRDF Government has successfully reduced 
poverty and improved food security. When aggregated across the whole population 
Ethiopia’s economic and human development indicators are indeed impressive. A closer 
analysis shows that progress has been uneven across the population. After a brief analysis 
of the broader equality landscape this section focuses on the inclusion of hard-to-reach 
groups. This is in order to assess how closing civic space has affected pathways to 
development impact for relatively disadvantaged groups.  
 
In a nation where 85 per cent of the population depends directly on agriculture, the EPRDF’s 
policy focus on increasing small farm productivity enabled them to produce growth with very 
low levels of inequality. Even today inequality levels in Ethiopia are very low when compared 
to other countries in the region, but the trend is now negative (World Bank 2017). Prior to 
2005, as the Ethiopian economy grew, the consumption of the poorest 40 per cent increased 
faster than the top 60 per cent and inequality reduced. Between 2005 and 2010 that trend 
reversed, however, and the top 60 per cent saw their consumption grow the fastest, rising 
inequality (World Bank 2016). Rising economic inequality was a common theme that 
emerged strongly in our research, an issue which warrants closer tracking. 
 
There are some groups that have been consistently disadvantaged across all of the 
chronological periods discussed in this report. Even though the decade preceding the 2005 
elections was the most open and inclusive period in Ethiopia’s modern history, ethnic 
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minority and stigmatized groups, as well as LGBTQI10 communities were consistently 
excluded from development, and experienced human rights violations. Providing services for 
rural women, people living with disabilities and those at the intersection of multiple 
dimensions of disadvantage often prove to be the hardest-to-reach. 
 
A combination of increasing inequality and the closure of CSOs that used to advocate for 
marginalised groups is causing concerns in some places. One interviewee who worked with 
rural communities in different regions of Ethiopia commented that she saw the 
improvements in the general level of income and health almost everywhere across the 
country: 
 
But what we are also starting to see is the growth of different classes. The gap 
between richest and poorest is growing. You can see it in people’s houses and 
cars. Inequality is noticeable now.  
 
Many of those that we spoke to were of the opinion that the Government’s national poverty 
reduction programmes had delivered substantial benefits. At the same time they argued that 
it is a feature of centrally driven programmes that they are insufficiently nuanced or flexible 
enough to meet the diverse contextual needs of marginalised communities or people with 
special needs. One international NGO Director that we interviewed claimed that such 
flexibility is what CSOs are best-placed to provide:  
 
Even the Government agrees that civil society is best placed to serve the 
hardest-to-reach: the geographically remote, people with disabilities, socially 
excluded. We found that the Government had lost political support by closing 
down organisations that people depended on. They shot themselves in the foot 
really. 
 
Several interviewees argued that identifying the complex needs of ‘hard-to-reach’ 
communities is a comparative advantage of CSOs. Government officials and disadvantaged 
rural minorities often speak different languages. Civil society can play an intermediary role, 
researching people’s needs, devising bespoke projects, and advocating for policy 
alternatives to make sure that inequality is addressed. One former poverty campaigner 
interviewed for this research pointed out that:  
 
The poorest and least educated often don’t sit at the decision-making table. They 
go unheard. Closing civil society down means there is less capacity to advocate 
[on their behalf]. They are being left behind. 
 
While acknowledging the EPRDF’s achievements in reducing poverty, one interviewee we 
spoke to argued that the Government could have been even more successful if it had 
partnered constructively with civil society where they add specific value in relation to hard-to-
reach groups: 
 
Government’s comparative advantage is national reach but the comparative 
advantage of civil society is the flexibility to tailor provision to minorities and 
people with special needs.   
  
According to more than one expert that we consulted the Government’s 70/30 spending 
restriction is a mechanism that particularly harms CSO’s ability to reach the most remote 
and marginalised:  
 
                                                     
10  In the Kembatta Tembaro Zone, there are marginalized and stigmatized artesian communities known by the derogatory 
name ‘Fuga’; the treatment of these communities is similar to that of ‘untouchable’ Dalit caste groups in India. Same 
sex relationship are illegal in Ethiopia and are punishable by up to 15 years imprisonment. 
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To reduce inequality we need to include the voices of the most marginalised but 
the 70/30 [rule] counts all travel costs as admin. So everyone is forced to 
operate closer to Addis than before. It works against participation. 
 
4.4 Gender equality and women’s empowerment 
In the period leading up to the 2005 elections Ethiopian CSOs were adopting an increasingly 
rights-based approach to gender equality. In addition to palliative programmes that 
addressed women’s immediate practical needs CSOs began involving citizens in a critical 
examination of the root-causes of gender inequality and in campaigns advocating for 
equality. This coincided with the period when the rights-based agenda was a priority for 
international donors. When the EPRDF closed down civic space following the outcome of 
the 2005 election the Proclamation on Civil Society prohibited all foreign-funded CSOs from 
engaging in any advocacy or rights-based work including women’s rights and legal 
advocacy.  
 
Several interviewees described the ways in which the Proclamation diminished their 
organisational ability to address gender-based violence and gender discrimination. Prior to 
the 2009 legislation, one organisation, a national leader in advocating for gender rights and 
securing gender equality, provided free legal aid and counselling to 20,000 women per year. 
The 2009 changes mean that it can now only support 1,000 women per year. An ex-
employee, when interviewed explained: 
 
We didn’t want to re-register as a ‘Resident’ organisation and be prevented from 
providing legal advocacy as we thought what was the point of existing if we can’t 
pursue our objectives? … But the Government seized two million Birr from our 
bank account and the loss of foreign-funding meant we had to scale down 
massively over the years.   
 
Even locally-funded organisations who registered as ‘Ethiopian CSOs’ found themselves 
substantially hampered by the 70/30 spending rule in ways that made it difficult to be 
inclusive of rural women and ethnic minorities. One interviewee who played a senior 
leadership role in a gender NGO explained: 
 
Before 2009 there was no restriction of any kind on gender CSOs. Now GBV 
trainings, monitoring and evaluation, programme and projects staff salaries, and 
all transport and fuel expenses are considered to be ‘administrative’ costs and 
may not exceed 30 per cent of total spend. As a result the volume of activities 
and geographical coverage is reduced. 
 
This reduction in collective capacity was echoed by an experienced leader who worked for a 
network of Ethiopian women’s organisations and who commented: 
 
Since 2009 our collective capacity to work on gender-based violence is down by 
80 per cent and capacity to work on legal service provision is down by more than 
half. We are less able to address gender inequality in Ethiopia. Much less. 
 
This scale of cuts extends beyond women’s rights organisation to other human rights 
organisation in Ethiopia. One human rights expert that we interviewed provided insight into 
the service delivery impact on another key organisation affected: 
 
The [Proclamation] affected rights-based [organisations] most. The Ethiopian 
Human Rights Council was a vibrant CSO before the law. It had 56 employees 
and 13 offices across the country. Now it has only 9 staff in total. 
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These drastic reductions in service provision capacity of CSOs took place in a context of the 
mass arrests of journalists, activists and opposition politicians making it impossible for 
Ethiopia to meet its SDG 16 objective of ‘making justice available to all’ and providing 
‘inclusive institutions at all levels’.  
 
Although Ethiopian women are guaranteed equality by the constitution, national laws and 
international treaties to which Ethiopia is a signatory, this is often unachievable in practice 
due to closing civic space. Many key CSOs that enabled women to realise these legal 
entitlements in practice no longer exist or now have severely diminished service delivery 
capacity.  
 
Although the EPRDF has diminished the capacity of Ethiopian civil society to tackle gender 
inequality, women continue to pursue gender justice through a variety of creative means. 
Many CSOs adapted to 2009 by replacing the language of advocacy and rights in their work 
with the language of empowerment, modifying their rhetoric without abandoning work to 
increase gender awareness and agency for social change. Another women’s organisation 
that we visited has been innovative in diversifying its income streams from within the 
country.   
 
Ethiopia successfully met six out of the eight Millennium Development Goals and made 
significant progress against the other two. The only targets that it did not meet related to 
gender. The evidence gathered from this research indicates that the EPRDF’s closure of 
civic space has further diminished its capacity to meet the goals of inclusive and equitable 
development and the Sustainable Development Goal to leave no one behind. The EPRDF 
closed civic space through a mixture of legal and regulatory measures, it reduced CSO’s 
funding using the 90/10 rule, and reduced their ability to serve marginalised groups with the 
70/30 rule. By creating this disabling environment for rights-based and advocacy work the 
Ethiopian Government has made it practically impossible for thousands of women to access 
legal support in times of crisis. The beneficiaries of the Government changes are those who 
discriminate against women or commit against women and who now go free. 
 
4.5 The role of the media and digital public space 
One of the features of Ethiopia’s closing civic space has been the remarkably rapid opening 
and closings of media spaces, both mass media and new online media. In many ways the 
period leading up to the 2005 elections was a false dawn. New political parties were formed 
and civil society expanded rapidly. Then in the six months before the mass media hosted a 
series of wide-ranging discussions about people’s priorities for national development. We 
interviewed one of the key organisers of those media debates who told us: 
 
We took a central role in facilitating a series of policy dialogues between 
government leaders, academics and professionals. The debates were broadcast 
live on radio and TV. Nothing like it has ever happened before or since. 
Everybody listened to those debates – everyone. By 2005 we had the most 
engaged and informed electorate ever.  
 
The EPRDF’s response to electoral losses in 2005 was not only the closing of civic space for 
CSOs in the form of the Proclamation on Civil Society but also to introduce new media 
restrictions in the form of the 2008 Mass Media Proclamation and the 2009 Terrorism Law. 
The closure of space for critical media was followed by the regular harassment and arrest of 
journalists and bloggers. According to Reporters Without Borders:  
 
Terrorism charges have been systematically used against journalists ever since 
the 2009 Terrorism Law took effect. The charges carry long jail sentences and 
allow the authorities to hold journalists without trial for extended periods. There 
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has been no significant improvement since the purges that led to the closure of 
six newspapers in 2014 and drove around 30 journalists into exile11. 
 
There have however been some openings of civic space in online media. As offline civic 
space has closed activists have created new spaces online. New social movements of youth 
have appeared in recent years who make novel use of mobile and social media. Called 
Qero12 in Oromia and Faro in Amhara, these groups have mobilised anti-government opinion 
and created powerful hashtags and memes to counter Government narratives and buoy 
opposition moral. Ethiopians interviewed for this research explained that these new social 
movements have created new online claimed spaces using mobile and social media 
technologies to say what cannot safely be said offline. They have used mobile and social 
media to bridge communication and build solidarity between the internal youth movements 
of different ethnic groups as well as to powerful groups in the Ethiopian diaspora. The Qero 
and Faro are not aligned to political parties or part of historic civil society structures, they are 
not donor-funded, do not have offices, or easily identifiable leadership. Unrestricted by 
logframes or the need to register with Government agencies these activists represent a clear 
threat to the ruling elites.  
 
The EPRDF has responded to this threat to its hegemony by arresting bloggers, blocking 
social media sites and shutting down the internet.13 The Government is the only internet 
provider in Ethiopia and the sole telephone operator. This enabled it to impose a complete 
internet shutdown outside of Addis and to impose a nationwide shutdown on more than one 
occasion. The Government also made it illegal to listen to or watch broadcasts by Ethiopian 
Satellite Radio and Television (ESAT) or Oromo Media Network (OMN), both of which are 
based abroad. Localized internet and phone blackouts are regularly reported following mass 
demonstrations. The mobile internet and social media including WhatsApp and Twitter have 
been blocked in parts of Oromia and other parts of the country on several occasions 
(Freedom House 2018). The Federal High Court has convicted many activists for comments 
made on social media, for emailing political parties outside the country, and even for 
expressing appreciation for someone who denounced the Prime Minister. One activist 
received a six-year prison sentence for his Facebook posts (Amnesty 2018).   
 
The EPRDF fully dispensed with any pretence of democratic process in the 2015 elections 
when it declared itself the winner of every single seat in Government with fully 99 per cent of 
all votes cast. In protests that erupted later that year, primarily in the Oromia and Amhara 
regions, protestors called for an end to land-seizures and human-rights abuses. The 
Government admitted to killing 500 protestors with opposition leaders putting the death toll 
at 800 (Human Rights Watch 2016). In October of 2016, then-Prime Minister Hailemariam 
Desalegn announced a six-month state of emergency, which was extended until August 
2017. Tens of thousands of protestors and suspected opposition activists were arrested, and 
reports of torture were widespread (Freedom House 2017). Under the state of emergency 
freedom of association and freedom of speech are suspended nationwide and meetings of 
more than four people require a licence from the military police ‘Command Post’. A new 
wave of protests in 2017 led to the instigation of a second state of emergency in February 
2018, which was still in place as this report was being drafted. More than one interviewee 
directly linked the continued protests to the closing of civic space. 
 
 
 
                                                     
11  https://rsf.org/en/ethiopia. 
12  www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill. 
13  https://qz.com/1157890/oromo-protests-ethiopia-has-blocked-social-media-sites-facebook-twitter-and-youtube/. 
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Some of those that we interviewed argued that there was a direct relationship between the 
Government’s closure of formal civic space and the outbursts of uncivil society, and unruly 
protest in the form of rioting and damage to Government property. A senior member of staff 
from a multi-lateral funding organisation commented: 
 
If there was active CSOs engagement in democracy-building and human right 
issues, open public dialogue, we would see less civil disobedience, which has 
led to police killing protesters. Civil society is a channel for civil influence.  
 
The same interviewees argued that when people are denied peaceful civic channels for 
political representation or means to influence civic debate and policy dialogue, outbursts of 
frustration and anger will increasingly be directed at the Government. A think tank 
researcher in Addis commented:  
 
That’s what we are seeing in Oromia. Frustration boiling over. There is no civic 
outlet for people’s frustrations. No channel for civil communication. 
 
 
5  Conclusions and implications 
5.1 The implications of changing civic space for development in Ethiopia 
The research set out to trace the pathways to impact from civic space closures in Ethiopia 
via the mechanism of CSO service delivery to any related changes in development impacts 
and to evaluate to what extent these effects were measurable. According to the conceptual 
framework, the domination of Ethiopia’s politics by a developmental elite coalition suggests 
that closures of civic space are unlikely to impact adversely on overall growth and public 
service delivery efforts in the short- to medium-term. However, in the medium-term, the 
pressures on a political system with limited to no civic or political space started to show. 
Over a decade after the Government cracked down on its perceived opposition to civil and 
political society after the 2005 election, this played out in early 2018 in the selection of a new 
Prime Minister from an ethnic and cultural background different to the fraction of the elite 
that had ruled to date. This was triggered by a series of increasingly deadly protests by 
important population groups who had to date been marginalized by or relatively excluded 
from the benefits of development, and for whom land policy had become a particular 
concern. The reconfiguration of the Ethiopian elite post-2018 may not open a new, more 
democratic pathway to development. However, it does support the view that long-term 
regime stability is unlikely where civil society is prevented from playing its role in helping to 
build trust, amplify voice, empower the marginalized and powerless, demand accountability, 
protect the most vulnerable, build development partnerships, and create space for the 
peaceful management of difference through open dialogue and free public discourse. 
 
The conceptual framework also proposed that closing civic space was particularly likely to 
impact adversely on the rights and needs of marginalised and excluded groups, possibly 
through a rise in rights violations with impunity, or a loss of service access or quality. The 
research results support this proposition, noting that how practical considerations of travel 
and physical access meant that NGOs and CSOs were dropping programmes in 
geographically remote populations, typically among the poorest and most politically 
powerless people. Programmes that had attempted to empower marginalized and 
impoverished groups, or protect their human rights, were pushed and pulled into urgent 
humanitarian relief, poverty reduction, and welfare service provision activities. Interviewees 
widely held the view that civil society has a unique and valuable set of advantages to offer 
the development process, in identifying and finding ways of reaching and serving these 
groups. Without this access and capacity to deliver needed services, significant sections of 
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the population may well be at risk of being left behind by development; closures of civic 
space makes such knowledge harder to come by, because travel to, programmes and 
research in remote regions have become highly restricted. Civil society generally plays a 
role in scrutinizing the distribution of humanitarian relief, a form of accountability which may 
be particularly important in the Ethiopian context. In addition, it was clear that gender 
equality and women’s empowerment organizations had been hard hit, and that this posed a 
particular challenge for Ethiopia’s efforts to meet the SDGs.  
 
It was also proposed that accountability for macroeconomic performance, as scrutiny and 
checks by the media and civil society are weakened or disabled, possibly leading to impacts 
on the business environment and political trust. The research concluded that the role of the 
conventional media was indeed greatly constrained by fluctuations in the space for free 
speech, but that more recently, digital public space had become a key focus for control by 
the Government. The general absence of ‘civil’ civic space in which to raise public concerns 
appears to have contributed to the rising tide of land- and related protests which culminated 
in states of emergency and further political and civil rights violations. The research was 
unable to uncover any clear impacts on the business environment or on political trust due to 
lack of data, but these are issues on which further investigation is indicated, in particular as 
the Ethiopian Government is so strongly committed to demonstrating development 
performance.  
 
A further set of propositions was likely adverse impacts on environmental sustainability, 
across a wide range of potential areas and sectors, but particularly in relation to land- and 
resource-grabbing. The study noted that land grabbing had been a significant cause of 
political turmoil, and that land reallocations and farm policy were likely to lead to the 
dispossession of marginalized and impoverished groups and to rising economic inequality.  
 
Ethiopia’s shrunken civic space is part of a wider pattern of such closures worldwide. The 
nature of these dynamic closings and openings of civic space, their causes and their 
consequences for development require on-going study, as does the relationship between the 
closures of civic space for human rights-based civil society on the one hand, and outbursts 
of uncivil rhetoric and unruly protest on the other. The new dimension of openings and 
closings of online civic space is even less well understood; its importance is increasing and 
requires dedicated research attention. The situation in Ethiopia remains dynamic. The 
underlying tensions within the ruling elites in the EPRDF have not been resolved. Whether 
the current political settlement endures or a new one emerges, the role of civil society and its 
service delivery capacity remains key and warrants on-going research attention. As this 
report was being finalised the new Prime Minster spoke on national television admitting for 
the first time that the EPRDF had committed human rights violations against its own citizens. 
A sceptical but hopeful civil society activist who played a central role in facilitating the 
inclusive national dialogue that took place prior to the 2005 elections: 
 
We would like to think that with the new Prime Minister a new process of 
dialogue might be possible. 
 
It seems clear that the new political leadership is likely to mean another series of changes in 
the Ethiopian civic space, and the changes, and the contributions of civil society in a more 
open civic space, should be tracked closely for their lessons about inclusive development 
processes and outcomes.  
 
5.2 Measuring the implications of civic space for development 
The Ethiopia case study offers robust insights into the likely nature of the impacts of 
restricted civic space on selected aspects of development, but more limited insights into the 
magnitudes of impact on specific populations. It is possible to say with confidence that 
32 
 
marginalized and poor populations in remote areas are in general likely to suffer most, as 
are women’s rights, gender equality, and the land rights and livelihoods of minority and 
marginalized groups and small farmers facing state-backed dispossession. It is impossible to 
comment on how many members of these populations may have experienced a loss of 
services, support, or protection as civic space has closed, or of the specifics in terms of how 
many people may have been made poorer or hungrier, or of how many women lost 
opportunities for livelihoods, training, or incorporation into markets. The Ethiopian case study 
also recognized the entry of new Government-organized citizen groups and entities into the 
civic space, but was unable to quantify the extent to which NGO or wider civil society 
functions of service delivery, accountability, and feedback for public services have been 
replaced by such institutions.  
 
It is also clear that NGOs do adapt to restricted space, some more successfully than others. 
One irony of the closure of civic space on grounds of resisting ‘foreign’ influences is that 
international organizations appear to have been more resilient than smaller, more 
specialized, and more local groups. Restricted civic space appears to have meant weak 
capacities of Ethiopian civil society to organize and network, and to collect and aggregate 
data about their collective contributions and impact. Efforts to enable civil society to 
collectively generate and share data about their contributions to development are likely to 
make measurement of development impacts more feasible, but also to strengthen the 
collective voice of civil society in contesting closures of civic space. 
 
CSOs and NGOs continue to undertake their activities, and in particular to provide services, 
within the space permitted. However, an additional methodological blindspot is that civil 
society actors also incur significant financial, institutional and human costs in adapting to 
and coping with restrictions on their activities. Staff tend to recognize that these adaptations 
mean a fundamental loss of quality in their programming, as well as in scale,  chiefly through 
swapping efforts to empower citizens and strengthen public accountability between 
marginalized and poor populations and their national or local government for less 
contentious service provision. This plainly limits NGO capacities to bring about the more 
enduring forms of social change demanded by inclusive development. Few of these costs of 
civil society adaptation and resilience are clearly quantifiable, but the nature of the impacts 
can be gauged through closer tracking by and of civil society of their responses to changes 
in civic space. 
 
The case study also indicates that the measurable impacts through these NGO service 
losses offer a limited and fragmented view of the wider effects of such closures. Services are 
likely to have been lost in other policy domains not surveyed here, such as education, 
health, or water and sanitation. It is also impossible to assess the question of which services 
and benefits may have been provided under conditions in which civil society had a voice in 
policymaking and scope to scrutinize and hold Government to account. Nonetheless, the 
case study provides clear indications that areas that are critical for Ethiopia’s development 
progress, for instance, attention to gender equality and women’s empowerment, are 
unserved by closures of civic space that target rights-based and advocacy groups. 
 
Other issues that the study points to, but cannot quantify the effects of, include (the loss or 
weakening of) the restraining role of civil society and free media on macroeconomic 
management and corruption. Macroeconomic mismanagement and corruption are frequent 
triggers of political and economic crisis in developing countries, and can interrupt, stall or 
even reverse development progress. In the Ethiopia case, with its high degree of control 
over digital public space, innovative new methodologies will be needed to assess the 
developmental costs from the loss of a preventive role of the media and civil society activism 
on broader economic governance.  
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It is early days, but the new political leadership since 2018 gives reasons to believe that civic 
space may reopen in Ethiopia. If so, this will provide a valuable opportunity to track and 
assess the contributions of civil society to inclusive, equitable and sustainable development 
in a low-income country which in the past quarter-century has made rapid, yet 
problematically uneven, development progress.  
 
  
34 
 
References 
Aalen, L. and Tronvoll, K. (2009) The End of Democracy? Curtailing Political and Civil Rights 
in Ethiopia, Review of African Political Economy No. 120:193-207.   
 
Alemayehu, G. and Addis, T. (2014) Growth Poverty and Inequality, 2000-2013: a 
Macroeconomic Appraisal, in Rahmato, D. et al (eds.) Reflections on Development in 
Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies and Freidrich Edbert Stiftung. 
 
Alkire, S. and Santos, M. (2010) Multi-Dimensional Poverty: a new index for developing 
countries. Human Development Research Paper, New York, UNDP. 
 
Assefa, A. and Zewde, B. (2008) Civil Society at the Crossroads: challenges and prospects 
in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies. 
 
Amnesty (2018) Amnesty International Report 2017/18: the state of the world’s human 
rights, London, Amnesty International. 
 
Assefa, Y. Damme, W. Williams, O. and Hill, P. (2017) Successes and challenges of the 
millennium development goals in Ethiopia: lessons for the sustainable development 
goals, British Medical Journal: Global Health Vol 2(2). 
 
Ayenew, M. (2014) The Growth and Transformation Plan: Opportunities, Challenges and 
Lessons, in Rahmato, D. et al (eds.) Reflections on Development in Ethiopia, Addis 
Ababa, Forum for Social Studies and Freidrich Edbert Stiftung. 
 
CCRDA (2011) Assessment of the Impact of the Charities and Societies Regulatory 
Framework on CSOs in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Consortium of Christian Relief and 
Development Associations.  
 
Cochrane, L. and Temiru, Y. (2016) Ethiopia’s Protective Safety Net Programme: Power, 
Politics and Practice, Journal of International Development, Vol 28, pp. 649-65.  
 
Cotula, L., Vermeulen, S., Leonard, R. & Keeley, J. (2009) Land grab or development 
opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. Rome: 
IIED, FAO, IFAD. 
 
De Waal, A. (2018) Mass Starvation: the history and future of famine, Cambridge, Polity 
Press. 
 
DFID (2016) Civil Society Support Programme Completion Report, London, Department for 
International Development.  
 
Dupuy, K., Ron, J. and Prahash, A. (2014) Who Survived? Ethiopia’s regulatory crackdown 
on foreign-funded NGOs, Review of International Political Economy. DOI: 
10.1080/09692290.2014.903854 
 
EEA (2017) Report on the Ethiopian Economy 2017, Addis Ababa, Ethiopian Economics 
Association. 
 
Freedom House (2017) Freedom in the World Ethiopia Profile, accessed 18 June 2018, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/ethiopia 
 
35 
 
Gagliardone, I. (2014) New Media and the Developmental State in Ethiopia, African Affairs, 
Volume 113, Issue 451, 1 April 2014, Pages 279–299. 
 
Gagliardone, I. Patel, A and Pohjonen, M. (2018) Mapping and Analysing Hatespeech 
Online: opportunities and challenges for Ethiopia, Oxford University. 
 
Haggard (2018) Developmental States, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hailegebriel, D. (2010) Defending Civil Society: Report on Laws and Regulations Governing 
Civil Society Organizations in Ethiopia, International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol 
12 (February 2010) www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12iss2/special_2.htm 
 
Hailegebriel, D. (2010a) Restrictions on Foreign Funding of in Ethiopia. International Journal 
of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 12 (2) 18-27. 
 
Hossain, N. et al (2018) What does Closing Civic Space Mean for Development? A 
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework, IDS Working Paper 515, Brighton: 
Institute of Development Studies, www.ids.ac.uk/publications/what-does-closing-
civic-space-mean-for-development-a-literature-review-and-proposed-conceptual-
framework-2/ (accessed 17 April 2019) 
 
Human Rights Watch (2016) Killings and Arrests in Response to Ethiopia’s Oromia Protests, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/06/15/such-brutal-crackdown/killings-and-arrests-
response-ethiopias-oromo-protests 
 
Johnson, C. (1982) MITI and the Japanese Miracle, Stanford University Press. 
 
Lavers, T. (2012) Land Grab as Development Strategy? The political economy of agricultural 
investment in Ethiopia, Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol 39 (1): 105-132. 
 
Lefort, R. (2015) “Famine” in Ethiopia: the key facts, Open Democracy website, published 12 
December 2015, accessed 12 June 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-
lefort/famine-in-ethiopia-key-facts#_ftn23 
 
MoFED (2003) Rural Development Policy and Strategies, Addis Ababa, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development. 
 
MoFED (2010) Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP), Addis Ababa, Ministry of Finance 
and Economic Development. 
 
Nega, B. and Milofsky, C. (2011) Ethiopia’s Anti-NGO Law and its Consequences for 
Economic Development, Community Development Journal, Vol 46 (2). 
 
Pausewang, S. and Zewde, B. eds. (2002) Ethiopia: Challenges of Democracy from Below, 
Addis Ababa, Nordic Africa Institute. 
 
Rahmato, D. (2008) The Voluntary Sector in Ethiopia: challenges and future Prospects, in 
Assefa, A. and Zewde, B. (2008) Civil Society at the Crossroads: challenges and 
prospects in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies. 
 
Reimann, K. (2006) ‘A view from the top: international politics, norms and the worldwide 
growth of NGOs’, International Studies Quarterly 50: 45–67. 
 
Schlein, L. (2018) Ethiopia: Nearly 8 million Ethiopians need emergency food and water, 
AllAfrica, 23rd March 2018, http://allafrica.com/stories/201803230164.html. 
36 
 
 
Sen, A. (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press. 
Stiglitz, J. (1996) Some Lessons From The East Asia Miracle, The World Bank Research 
Observer, Volume 11, Issue 2, 1 August 1996, Pages 151–177. 
 
Tadele, A. (2015) Civil Society Landscape in Ethiopia, London, Save The Children. 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58c2e1ba86e6c0616c3a318a/t/5a67516aec21
2de43354c84f/1516720491993/Packard_Accelerator_Tadele_work_example.pdf 
 
UNDP (2015) MDG Report Ethiopia, New York, United Nations Development Programme. 
 
UNDP (2016) Human Development Report: Briefing note on Ethiopia, New York, United 
Nations Development Programme.  
 
World Bank (2014) Ethiopia Poverty Assessment 2014, Washington, World Bank Group. 
 
World Bank (2016) Gini Index Estimate 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=ET 
 
World Bank (2017) Global Propects, Washington, World Bank Group. 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/26800/978146481024
4.pdf?sequence=14&isAllowed=y 
 
WFP (2018) Ethiopia Emergency Situation Report, World Food Program. 
https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/8124216d51624808a9bf8385115770e8/downloa
d/ 
 
Yntiso, G. Haile-Gebriel, D. and Ali, K. (2014) Non-State Actors in Ethiopia: Update 
Mapping, Addis Ababa, European Union Civil Society Support Programme. 
 
Zewde, B. and Pausewnag, S. (2002) Ethiopia: the challenge of democracy from below, 
Addis Ababa, Forum for Social Studies and Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.  
